

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 120391
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EA:NSILVER

APPROVED BY:EA:KMQUINN

S/S-O:RPERITO

-----250339Z 031917 /73

P 250224Z MAY 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 120391

EXDIS EYES ONLY FOR DEPUTY ASST SECY OAKLEY

FOLLOWING REPEAT MANILA 7863 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 23 MAY.

QUOTE: S E C R E T MANILA 7863

EXDIS

SECSTATE FOR HOLBROOKE

DEPARTMENT PASS IMMEDIATE TO NSC FOR ARMACOST FROM STULL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, MPOL

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS

1. MR. MICHAEL ARMACOST, NSC, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ASIA,
AND I MET MAY 23 WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF
HOURS. AFTER PRELIMINARIES, I ASKED PRESIDENT MARCOS IF
HE SHARED MY IMPRESSION THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CERTAIN
PAUCITY OF PRIVATE INFORMAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO
GOVERNMENTS, AS OPPOSED TO THE RATHER SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT

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OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AND SET PIECE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS.
MARCOS DECIDEDLY AGREED WITH THIS SUGGESTION, POINTING
OUT THAT HE HAD PROPOSED MORE BACK AND FORTH INFORMAL
COMMUNICATIONS AS LONG AGO AS AMBASSADOR BYROADE'S TIME,
AND MOST RECENTLY DURING THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HOLBROOKE. BUT THERE HAD BEEN DIFFICULTIES, E.G.,
PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES, MOSTLY CONCERNING MRS. MARCOS,

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE KISSINGER/ROMULO TALKS, PRESS LEAKS, ETC.

2. I VENTURED THE OPINION THAT WE MIGHT EVEN ASK OURSELVES DO WE NEED NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL? MARCOS REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES WHAT WE REALLY DO WANT. ARMACOST INQUIRED IF HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS WITH UNDERSECRETARY HABIB. MARCOS REPLIED, "WITH ANYONE IN A CONTINUING INFORMAL PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITHOUT THE PRESS, THAT'S IMPORTANT."

3. MARCOS SEEMED TO WANT TO ESTABLISH DEFINITION OF US COMMITMENTS UNDER THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY AS HIS MAJOR CONCERN. HOWEVER, AFTER REFERRING BACK TO THEN DCM WILSON'S UNSATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION BEFORE THE SYMINGTON COMMITTEE, COMPLAINING ABOUT "THE ELEVATION TO THE MUTUAL DEFENSE BOARD" EARLIER THIS YEAR OF HIS "QUIET QUESTION" ON THE US COMMITMENT, AND STRIKING A GLANCING BLOW AT KISSINGER FOR AN UNSATISFACTORY FORMULATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MARCOS CAME DOWN RATHER DIRECTLY ON THE CORE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OF "RENT" FOR THE BASES.

4. RECALLING THE TIME DURING AMBASSADOR BYROADE'S TENURE WHEN, "WE HAD DIFFICULTY IN ARMING OUR MILITARY FORCES," MARCOS SAID HE PREVIOUSLY ALWAYS HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WERE ALL PART OF ONE PACKAGE. NOW MILITARY ASSISTANCE APPARENTLY CAN BE CUT FOR EXTRANEIOUS REASONS, BUT UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS? ALL THIS SECRET

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HAS MOTIVATED THE GOP TO PREPARE A SELF-RELIANCE PACKAGE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND TO EMBRACE THE CONCEPT OF "RENT". ARMACOST EXPLAINED THE US POSITION ON "RENT" INCLUDING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP, AND THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPLICATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. MARCOS INDICATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THESE AND A NUMBER OF RELATED TOPICS WITH KISSINGER WITHOUT RESULT, INDEED THE PHILIPPINES HAD BEEN ATTACKED PUBLICLY AS BLACKMAILERS DEMANDING "RENT", SO "WE BEGAN TO KEEP QUIET."

5. HE SAID THAT RENT IS SEEN BY THE GOP AS THE MEANS TO MILITARY SELF-RELIANCE. SINCE THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY APPARENTLY DOES NOT COVER THE MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF ARMS (E.G., MINDANAO), THE GOP MUST PROVIDE FOR THAT FACT AND/OR CONTINGENCY. THE GOP WANTED THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY CLARIFIED FOR SUCH CONTINGENCIES. ARMACOST INTERJECTED THAT SUCH CLARIFICATION IS VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN IN THE GIVEN POLITICAL CONTEXT. MARCOS REPLIED THAT HE

RELAIZED THIS, ADDING THAT IT WAS KISSINGER'S INSISTENCE THAT THE GOP SETTLE UPON A FIXED PRICE THAT COLLAPSED THE NEGOTIATIONS LAS NOVEMBER. I NOTED THAT "RENT" COULD TAKE MANY FORMS, CASH, HARDWARE OR FUNGIBLE ECONOMIC PROJECTS. MARCOS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS.

6. MARCOS VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH HOLBROOKE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DELAY FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. BUT MEANWHILE, HE ALSO ARGUED, WE SHOULD BE DISCUSSING THE ISSUES AND REVIEWING AREAS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. HE THEN TURNED TO ME AND WITH REFERENCE TO A FRESH INCIDENT OF GUARD DOGS ALLEGEDLY ATTACKING SCAVENGERS AT CLARK AIR BASE, SAID, "CAN'T YOU GET YOUR PEOPLE OFF THAT PRACTICE? I KNOW THEY HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS, BUT THIS INCIDENT IS GOING TO CAUSE ME A LOT OF TROUBLE. PERHAPS WE CAN HELP YOU WITH CONTROL OF THE BASE PERIPHERY. THINGS ARE DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT INCIDENTS LIKE
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THIS." I REPLIED WE CERTAINLY SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO IMPROVE, MODIFY AND CORRECT SUCH SITUATIONS. WE SHOULDN'T HAVE TO FREEZE ALL IMPROVEMENTS PENDING NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED, IF WE PROCEED PRAGMATICALLY WE MIGHT EVEN FIND NO FORMAL NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED. MARCOS CONCLUDED, "IF WE CAN IMPROVE ON THE STRUCTURE OF OUR RELATIONS PRAGMATICALLY AS YOU SUGGEST, I'M ALL FOR IT. LET'S GO TO IT*"

7. MARCOS REFERRED BRIEFLY TO HIS JAPAN VISIT REPEATING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE US NOT RELY ON JAPAN AS SPOKESMAN FOR OR TO ASIA. ARMACOST ASSURED HIM WE DID NOT INTEND TO DO THAT. MARCOS THEN INVITED ARMACOST TO COMMENT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES FROM SALT, THROUGH VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS, TO THE STATUS OF TAIWAN, WHICH IS "OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE PHILIPPINES." IN HIS COMMENTS ON VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS, ARMACOST TOOK THE OCCASION TO UNDERLINE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE BY EMPAHSIZING THE DECIDED ROLE IT PLAYED IN INHIBITING ANY AMERICAN DISPOSITION TO ASSIST THE SRV. PRESIDENT MARCOS REQUESTED AND WAS GIVEN A COPY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH AT NOTRE DAME.

8. COMMENT: ARMACOST IS ENGROSSED ELSEWHERE AND HAS NOT CLEARED THIS MESSAGE. BUT I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT ARMACOST SHARES MY IMPRESSION (A) THAT MARCOS IS INTERESTED IN IMPROVING HIS COMMUNICATION WITH THIS EMBASSY AND THE USG IN GENERAL, (B) THAT HE IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER A VARIETY OF FORMS AND LEVELS OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, (C) THAT HE IS NOT NOW PRESSING FOR FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, SPECIFICALLY ON THE MILITARY BASES, AND (D) THAT HE

APPEARED TO BE INTRIGUED WITH THE NOTION OF A MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO RESOLVING ISSUES RELATING TO THE BASES, IN THE ABSENCE, AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN IN LIEU OF, NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FORMAL AGREEMENT.

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9. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE ABOVE COULD LEAD TO SOME SUBSTANTIAL REVISIONS IN OUR APPROACH TO THE MILITARY BASES QUESTION. BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR EXPLORING ITS POSSIBILITIES, IN OUR OWN THINKING AND CONCURRENTLY WITH MARCOS. WE MAY FIND THAT THE ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH WE BASED OUR DECISION TO RENEGOTIATE ARE NO LONGER VALID, AND THAT THE INERTIA OF THOSE THEN PROTRACTED AND NOW SUSPENDED NEGOTIATIONS NO LONGER SERVES OUR BEST INTERESTS.

10. THE US HAS A MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES VALID UNTIL 1991, WHICH WORKS MOSTLY SATISFACTORILY. THERE ARE PHILIPPINE DISSATISFACTIONS WITH SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THAT AGREEMENT, SOME OF THEM FUNDAMENTAL. BUT THE QUESTION REMAINS, DO WE NEED A NEW AGREEMENT, WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES IN TERMS OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, FOR EXAMPLE? AND WILL MARCOS EVER SET HIS SIGNATURE TO A NEW AGREEMENT, WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES FOR HIM IN TERMS OF CERTIFYING THAT IT IS A "GOOD AGREEMENT" BEFORE HIS DETRACTORS AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT? WHAT WE NEED MOST, IT SEEMS TO ME, ARE MODIFICATIONS IN OUR MILITARY BASE PRESENCE AND PRACTICES SUFFICIENT TO ALLAY PHILIPPINE DISSATISFACTIONS, STRAINS AND FRICTIONS AT ALL LEVELS. ANY SUCH MODIFICATIONS SHOULD OF COURSE PERMIT OUR CONTINUED EFFECTIVE ACCESS AND UTILIZATION OF THE BASES. HOWEVER, OUR PRESENT PREOCCUPATION WITH FORMAL RENEGOTIATION SEEMS TO HAVE IMMOBILIZED US ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL CHANGES, EVEN THOSE IN OUR OWN DIRECT INTEREST, SUCH AS RETURNING MARGINAL REAL ESTATE, MUST BE WITHHELD FOR POSSIBLE BARGAINING USE IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN AND IF.

11. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THAT WE HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT OUR ASSUMPTIONS, INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS. MEANWHILE, ON THE PHILIPPINE SIDE, WE SHOULD NOT MOVE TOO FAST. RATHER, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO

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S/S:A.OTTO

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO CINCPAC

S E C R E T STATE 120391

EXDIS MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING REPEAT MANILIA 7863 ACTION SECSTATE BANGKOK 25 MAY 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T MANILA 7863

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SECSTATE FOR HOLBROOKE

DEPARTMENT PASS IMMEDIATE TO NSC FOR ARMACOST FROM STULL

E. O. 11652: GDS

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, MILITARY PLANS, MILITARY BASE AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE120391
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA:NSILVER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770518/aaaaapsl.tel
Line Count: 471
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1249498a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2370671
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MPOL, RP, US, (MARCOS, FERDINAND), (ARMACOST, MICHAEL)
To: BANGKOK
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1249498a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009